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Preface: On Revenge
Anna Maria Jones
Associate Professor, University of Central Florida
I believed then, as I believe now, that I stood … in the place of an injured man, whose right it was, in
self-defense and self-assertion, to injure you. … On my side, I had indefatigable patience … and more
than all, that stealthy, unflagging strength of purpose which only springs from the desire for
revenge.
—Wilkie Collins, Basil (1852)
It is not eminent talent that is required to ensure success in any pursuit, so much as purpose—not
merely the power to achieve, but the will to labour energetically and perseveringly. Hence energy of
will may be defined to be the very central power of character in a man—in a word, it is the Man
himself.
—Samuel Smiles, Self-Help (1859)
When Robert Mannion, the scheming villain of Wilkie Collins’s sensation novel Basil, reveals
his revenge plot to the eponymous narrator, it might appear at first that he has thrown off the mantle
of middle-class respectability to expose his “true” monstrous self: rapacious, violent, motivated
equally by perverse appetites and the desire for vengeance.i Yet, I would suggest that the relationship
between Mannion’s persona as socially-productive, disciplined, and efficient self-made man and his
role as a stealthily, indefatigably vengeful plotter is much more synergistic than antagonistic.
Mannion stakes a claim to revenge based on his very rights as a man. The fear that Basil explores is
that the “good citizen” of modern liberal society might also be the mauvais sujet of revenge, not
because the semblance of the former masks the latter, but, more disturbingly, because Mannion’s
“right to injure” is fundamental to the very social order that he ostensibly threatens. In other words, it
is no coincidence that a villain like Mannion emerges at the same historical moment as some of the
most enthusiastic articulations of liberal ideals of self-determining, autonomous subjectivity.
Mannion not only embodies the very qualities that, according to Samuel Smiles’s runaway bestseller
Self-Help, “make the man”— “great perseverance, application, and energy” (30)—but these qualities
are explicitly the products of his “desire for revenge.” So, what might that intersection of revenge
fantasies with the liberal dream of self-determination and economic success that Smiles’s book
pedaled in 1850s England have to tell us about revenge as a cultural phenomenon and a fictional
device? What is happening at the interstices between revenge and rights, in other words?
Nietzsche called the phenomenon ressentiment, and according to his account in On the
Genealogy of Morals (1887), it is one of the defining, culturally-productive features of modern liberal
society because, as he says, it “becomes creative and gives birth to values: the ressentiment of natures
that are denied the true reaction, that of deeds, and compensate themselves with an imaginary
FORUM | ISSUE 13 Anna Maria Jones 2
revenge” (36; First Essay, Section 10). Ressentiment is the imaginative work of converting weakness
and vulnerability to injury into moral virtues, and, consequently, conceiving of potentially-injurious
external forces as positively evil: 
Slave morality from the outset says No to what is “outside,” what is “different,” what is
“not itself”; and this No is its creative deed. This inversion of the value-positing eye—this
need to direct one’s view outward instead of back to oneself—is of the essence of
ressentiment: in order to exist, slave morality always first needs a hostile external world;
it needs, physiologically speaking, external stimuli in order to act at all—its action is
fundamentally reaction. (36–37)
And, this conversion of powerlessness and the desire for vengeance into moral
superiority creates a socio-legal system in which the law functions to redress injury, “to
sanctify revenge under the name of justice—as if justice were at bottom merely a further
development of the feeling of being aggrieved—and to rehabilitate not only revenge but
all reactive affects in general” (73–74; Second Essay, Section 11). 
Wendy Brown explores this “reactive” dynamic in States of Injury when she invokes Nietzsche’s
ressentiment to explain “the contemporary proliferation of efforts to pursue legal redress for injuries
related to social subordination,” which project, she argues, “seeks not power or emancipation for the
injured or the subordinated, but the revenge of punishment, making the perpetrator hurt as the
sufferer does” (27). Without discounting the realities of social injury or the need to address injustices,
Brown highlights one troublesome effect of the “politics of ressentiment”:  “Social injury … becomes
that which is ‘unacceptable’ and ‘individually culpable’ rather than that which symptomizes deep
political distress in a culture: injury is thereby rendered intentional and individual, politics is reduced
to punishment, and justice is equated with such punishment on the one hand and with protection by
the courts on the other” (27–28). In other words, revenge narratives cast social violence in individual
terms—in which the punishment of offenders offers satisfying resolution and reward for victims—and
by so doing they forestall substantive critique of, or intervention in, the larger systems that enable
individual instances of social violence.
Revenge plots offer particularly compelling combinations of fear and self-justification to those
who consume them. The injuries that others may do to the innocent, the infringements upon victims’
rights, loom with a kind of Gothic terror. Conversely the righteous vengeance that is due to the injured
not only provides satisfying “closure,” but authorizes whole narrative arcs of ethically-justified
violence. Who cannot recall a film premised upon the vigilante hero’s quest for vengeance against an
enemy who has wronged him (or less frequently her)?ii Or who cannot think of a thriller in which the
vengeful villain preys upon more or less innocent and unsuspecting victims until he or she meets a
satisfyingly violent end, usually at the hands of a suddenly-empowered victim?iii 
But the appeal of revenge plots is by no means limited to fiction; rather, it structures much of
our public discourse about crime and violence. It is not difficult to call to mind a report of a horrific
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crime in the news, which then produces a public outcry calling for equally gruesome violence. A 2008
article in the online London Evening Standard, for example, offers a highly sensationalized account of
the Austrian father Joseph Fritzl’s 24-year imprisonment and rape of his daughter, by whom he
fathered seven children. Truly, Fritzl’s heinous crimes, to which he eventually confessed, defy
imagination. It hardly seems hyperbolic to call him a monster. And, yet, the public responses to the
article, from readers all over the world, describe retributions which, were they reported as crimes
rather than fantasized about as punishments, would likely elicit the same horror from readers: 
“He should be electrocuted and castrated as soon as possible.” - Aliyah Parker, Newark
“My heart goes out to the poor children, especially Elisabeth. I have no words to express
how this man should be tortured.” - Darrin, New York, USA
“He must be killed, in a torturous way, that this sick world get ride of such a dirt.” - Vn,
Middle East
“I am a 6"4 325 pound former football player send him down here to Louisiana, I will
take care of him.” - Jason, South louisiana 
“This cruel man should be handed over to Public Crowd and ask crowd to beat him with
stones until he die on same spot. He owe each and every drop of his blood to his innocent
daughter.” - Teena, Canada
“pure evil... he should be eatin alive by rats and left for dead.....” - inni, New Zealand.
(“Pictured,” all spelling and punctuation preserved from the original)iv
Revenge against Joseph Fritzl, or at least the public (if mostly anonymous) expression of the desire for
that revenge, seems both to affirm the rights of the abused daughter Elisabeth and to deny the rights
of her abuser. The gesture of compassion to the child, the “heart going out to” her, is concomitant with
the call to torture, to murder the bad father. This ethical differentiation between the violence one
condemns in others and the behavior one finds justified in response to, as revenge for, others’ violence
is enabled by the individual character of the narrative: one innocent victim, one monster, one Gothic
tale of imprisonment, rescue, and retribution. But, as Brown reminds us, this focus on the individual
prevents us from asking what of Joseph Fritzl’s case is not monstrously aberrant. His masculine
privilege as “head of the house”? The inhumanity of bureaucracies:  police who returned an escaped
teenage Elisabeth to her parents; social workers who visited the Fritzl house frequently but failed to
notice a dungeon in the basement?
But, even more than this, revenge creates a subject out of injury—the injured self emerges as
an effect of its injuries, both past (resented) and future (dreaded). The “rights” by which we define
universal personhood are defining precisely because they mark the territorial boundary at which the
actions of another become a violation of that personhood. Thus, I would suggest, the fictional revenge
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plots we consume, however farfetched, resonate with our fundamental conceptions of ourselves as
selves. This is, I think, partly what William Godwin meant when he wrote in An Enquiry Concerning
Political Justice (1793): “In reality nothing can appear more wonderful to the careful enquirer, than
that two ideas so incompatible as man and rights should ever have been associated together. Certain it
is, that one of them must be utterly exclusive and annihilatory of the other” (67; bk. 2, ch. 5). As I have
argued elsewhere, Godwin’s Gothic novel Caleb Williams (1794) critiques, and attempts to offer
ethical alternatives to, the self-annihilatory logic of individual rights (Jones). I think Collins’s Basil
offers a similarly useful interrogation of the interdependency of rights and revenge. Texts like these
are interesting because they invite their readers to think about revenge, not merely as an individual
pathology or as the legitimate, satisfying exercise of personal autonomy, but as a problematic and
complex social function. 
This special issue of FORUM represents a valuable intellectual undertaking in the same way.
The essays here cover topics ranging from Sophocles’ Women of Trachis to Irvine Welsh’s
Trainspotting, from Ben Jonson’s The Alchemist to Neil Gaiman’s The Sandman. Of course revenge
means differently in these different texts and genres and in the various historical moments and
cultural locations that produced them. Vengeance in The Merchant of Venice may or may not have
much in common with vengeance in Gaudy Night or I Spit on Your Grave. The differences matter.
But, given the centrality and, I would argue, taken-for-grantedness of revenge as a narrative pleasure
and an interactive mode in our contemporary context, these disparate analyses together also have
much to say to us about ourselves.
i Mannion, a confidential clerk for (and future partner of) a linen draper, has plotted secretly, patiently to
corrupt Basil’s young wife, Margaret, who is also his employer’s daughter, all to pay back the hapless Basil for
injustice done to Mannion’s father by Basil’s father.
ii
 Think for example of films like the following: I Spit on Your Grave (1978, 2010), The Punisher (1989, 2004),
The Crow (1994), Payback (1999), Kill Bill (2003–04), Memento (2000), A Man Apart (2003),  Man on Fire
(2004). These are just a few titles that come to mind. One might easily think of a dozen more, even excluding the
ones based on literary works, like The Count of Monte Cristo or Hamlet. Nor is the popularity of the revenge plot
exclusive to Hollywood; one might include titles like Eskiya (1996), Oldeuboi (2003), Om Shanti Om (2007), Låt
den Rätte Komma In (2008), and Kokuhaku (2010), from Turkey, South Korea, India, Sweden, and Japan
respectively.
iii
 Think of Cape Fear (1962, 1991), Fatal Attraction (1987), or The Hand that Rocks the Cradle (1992). This is
also the set-up for many of the horror franchises like A Nightmare on Elm Street (1984–2010) and Halloween
(1978–2009), though the vengeful monsters in these are, of course, much more robust than the human villains
who are dispatched with relative ease in The Hand that Rocks the Cradle and similar thrillers.
iv
 One needn’t go back to 2008 to find instances of public calls for revenge in response to individual crimes. The
high-profile trial in Orlando, Florida of Casey Anthony for the murder of her two-year-old daughter received
highly sensationalized international media coverage, and, when she was acquitted, so did the death threats against
the defendant, her parents and her defense attorney, and the jurors who delivered the not-guilty verdict. See, for
example, a July 14, 2011 article on the UK tabloid Daily Mail Web site, which reported breathlessly that “the
woman, known only as juror number 12, left her job and went into hiding fearing co-workers would ‘want her
head on a platter’” (“Casey Anthony”). 
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